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by Oliver Morse, Assistant Professor of Law,
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(Second of Two Parts)
REMOVAL JURISDICTION.
Defined.
R MOVAL JURISDICTION IS THE AUTHORITY by which a cause of
action or claim can be transferred, before trial, from a state
court to a federal district court. This jurisdiction is purely statu-
tory and as such finds its authority and the manner and conditions
upon which that authority is to be exercised, in the acts of Con-
gress. In the grant of that authority, Congress is confined to the
limits of the constitution. Congressional authority for removal
jurisdiction is not found in any of the express grants of juris-
diction in the constitution. Congress' power to provide for re-
moval jurisdiction is an implied power which is necessary and
proper to give effect to its express powers. 14 9
Source of Removal Jurisdiction.
The source of authority for removal jurisdiction is found in
section 1441, Title 28, of the United States Code; paragraph (b)
thereof states:
"(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have
original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising
under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States
shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or resi-
dence of the parties. Any other such action shall be remov-
able only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and
served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such
action is brought."
A reading of this section reveals that the removal jurisdiction of
the federal courts is confined by their original jurisdiction. In
other words, removal jurisdiction cannot attach if the suit could
not have been originally brought in the federal courts. If the
claim involves a federal question, then removal does not depend
149 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (1816).
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on citizenship. However, if jurisdiction is based upon diversity
of citizenship, removal is reserved only to the non-resident de-
fendant or defendants. The presence of a resident citizen, prop-
erly joined, defeats the right to removal.
As a Derivative Jurisdiction.
Removal jurisdiction is a derivative jurisdiction. 150 "The
power of removal is certainly not, in strictness of language an
exercise of original jurisdiction; it presupposes an exercise of
original jurisdiction to have attached elsewhere." 151 The federal
court receives a claim in the condition in which it leaves the state
court; if the state court had no jurisdiction then the federal court
has none. This is so even if the federal court would have had
original jurisdiction of the claim, if it were brought in the federal
court in the first instance. 152 The reasoning seems to be that a
case cannot be removed from a forum that never had authority
itself to take cognizance of the case. If the state court lacked
jurisdiction, a removal to the federal court cannot remedy the
jurisdictional defect. 153 However, once a removal is effected, and
the state court had jurisdiction upon that removal, subsequent
events which might occur that would not have supported the
jurisdiction of the state court in the first instance are unavailing
to affect the federal courts' jurisdiction, provided it was a claim
of which the federal courts would have had original jurisdiction
in the first instance. 154
150 See, Evans, Walter M., "The Removal of Causes; Federal Removal
Jurisdiction in Diversity of Citizenship Cases," 1947, 33 Virginia Law Review
445, 450-453.
151 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 350-7 (1816).
152 "The jurisdiction of the Federal court on removal is, in a limited sense
a derivative jurisdiction. If the state court lacks jurisdiction of the subject
matter or of the parties, the Federal court acquires none, although it might
in a like suit, originally brought there, have had jurisdiction." Lambert
Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 258 U. S. 377, 382 (1921).
153 "When a cause is removed from a state court into a Federal Court, the
latter takes it as it stood in the former. A want of jurisdiction in the State
court is not cured by the removal. . . . General Investment Co. v. Lake
Shore & M. S. R. Co., 260 U. S. 261, 288 (1922).
154 "We see no reason in precedent or policy for extending that rule so as
to bar amendments to the complaint, otherwise proper, merely because they
could not have been made if the action had remained in the state court.
If the federal court has jurisdiction of the removed cause and if the amend-
ment to the complaint could have been made had the suit originated in the
federal court, the fact that the federal court acquired jurisdiction by re-
moval does not deprive it of power to allow the amendment." Freeman v.
Bee Machine Co., 319 U. S. 448, 451 (1942).
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Federal Question and Diversity Jurisdiction.
When jurisdiction is predicated on a federal question, the test
of removability is the plaintiff's complaint. 15 5 Just as in federal
question jurisdiction, the plaintiff is the master of his complaint,
and no action on the part of the defendant is availing in the de-
termination as to whether or not the plaintiff's claim arises under
a federal law. The form of the plaintiff's complaint independent
of the merits of his claim, or the allegations of the defendant, is
the determinate as to the existence of federal question jurisdic-
tion.
When jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, the
petition for removal is the determinate factor. The plaintiff's
allegations as to the citizenship of the defendant are not final, be-
cause diversity must actually exist to support jurisdiction. This
diversity must obtain both when the suit is begun in the state
court, and also when the petition for removal is filed.156
Waiver.
The right of removal was historically established for the de-
fendant's protection and benefit and as such, it is deemed a
privilege which the defendant may waive, expressly or impliedly.
An express waiver presents no problem, but a waiver by conduct
is not always easy to discern.157 The test is whether the defend-
ant's actions in the state court indicate such a design to abide
by the state court's jurisdiction as to estop him from claiming
otherwise.158 It has been held, that the mere taking of depositions
under the state law is not only not a waiver but indeed a method
in support of contentions for or against removal. 159 A general
155 "In the absence of a fraudulent purpose to defeat removal, the plaintiff
may, by the allegations of his complaint, determine the status with respect
to removability of a case arising under a law of the United States when it is
commenced, and that this power to determine the removability of his case
continues with the plaintiff throughout the litigation, so that whether such
a case, non-removed when commenced, shall afterwards become removable,
depends not upon what the defendant may allege or prove, or what the
court may, after hearing upon the merits, in invitum, order, but solely upon
the form which the plaintiff by his voluntary action shall give to the plead-
ings in the case as it progresses toward a conclusion." Great Northern R.
Co. v. Alexander, 246 U. S. 276, 282 (1917).
156 Gibson v. Bruce, 108 U. S. 561 (1883).
157 Flory, Ira S. Jr., "Federal Removal Jurisdiction," 1939, 1 Louisiana Law
Review 499, provides a good perusal of the instances amounting to waiver,
pp. 510-514.
158 Duvall v. Wabash Ry. Co., 9 F. 2d 83 (1923).
159 Ibid.
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appearance is not a waiver. 16 0 Applying for and obtaining a bill
of particulars is, however, a waiver.' 6 ' One case has held that
the filing by a defendant, in the state court, an answer and motion
to dissolve a restraining order which had been awarded ex parte
is not a waiver. 1 2 A demurrer to a complaint, because it does not
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, was held a
waiver because the demurrer raised issues involving the merits.
The court felt that to allow a removal in such an instance would
permit a litigant to experiment in the state court and if he were
unsuccessful, to remove to the federal court.163
Safeguarding the Right to Remove.
The courts have been willing and diligent in the safeguarding
of the right to remove. That right was beset by a Denial attitude,
which has since been rejected. In the Home Insurance Co. of
N. Y. v. Morse case,' 6 4 a state statute which directed that a cor-
poration organized in another state could not transact business
within the local state unless it agreed in advance not to remove,
any action brought against it by a citizen of the local state, to the
federal courts, was held unconstitutional. Not long after, the
same state, through its legislature, passed an act which directed
the secretary of state to revoke the license of any foreign in-
surance company licensed to do business in that state, if that
insurance company should remove a suit brought against it, by a
resident citizen, to the federal courts. In upholding the validity of
the statute, the court in Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co. stated:
"The effect of our decision in this respect is that the State may
compel the foreign company to abstain from the Federal
Courts, or to cease to do business in that State; that State
has authority at any time to declare that it shall not transact
business there. This is the whole point of the case and, with-
out reference to the injustice, the prejudice or the wrong that
is alleged to exist, must determine the question." 15
This Denial holding acknowledges "the injustice, the prejudice or
the wrong" which will result therefrom. All that the holding
perceives, is the sovereignty of the state and its sovereign right to
160 Collins Mfg. Co. v. Wickwire Spencer Steel Co., 11 F. 2d 196 (1926).
161 Ex parte Bopst, 95 F. 2d 828 (1938).
162 Atlanta, K. & N. Ry. Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 131 F. 657 (1904).
163 Alley v. Nott, 111 U. S. 472 (1883).
164 Home Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445 (1874).
165 Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U. S. 535, 542 (1876).
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control within its boundaries. No considerations of the national
economic repercussions of such enactments affect the reason of
the majority opinion. On the other hand, the dissent is a socio-
economic discourse of generously Active proportions;
"The conditions of society and the modes of doing business in
this country are such that a large part of its transactions is
conducted through the agency of corporation. This is es-
pecially true with regard to the business of banking, insur-
ance and transportation. Individuals cannot safely engage
in enterprises of this sort, requiring large capital.
They can only be successfully carried out by corpora-
tions, in which individuals may safely join their small con-
tributions without endangering their entire fortunes. To shut
these institutions out of neighboring states would deprive the
people of those states of the benefits of their enterprise." 166
Not one legal premise is couched in this reasoning, except that
it is mindful of the national equities involved in the case. Suffice
it to say that the dissent finally offers a legal premise to effect
its holding, but no one should have any doubts as to the spirit
motivating the dissent. Eventually the Doyle case was overruled
by the Terral v. Burke Construction Co. case. 6 T Whatever the
reason, the federal courts are not willing to sacrifice the national
right to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts by removal
or otherwise, in favor of state sovereignty.'
6 8
Separate and Independent Claims or Causes of Action.
Today, the separable controversy is no longer an authority
for removal jurisdiction. The new statute is indicative of the
holding in the Hum case and reads:
"Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of
action, which would be removable is sued upon alone, is
joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or
causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the
district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its dis-
cretion, may remand all matters not otherwise within its
original jurisdiction." 169
166 Ibid., p. 543.
167 Terral v. Burke Construction Co., 257 U. S. 529 (1921).
168 "The jurisdiction of federal courts may not be limited or impaired by
state legislation conferring exclusive jurisdiction of litigation upon state
courts or prescribing exclusive methods of invoking that jurisdiction."
Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. v. Morris, 132 F. 945 (1904).
169 28 U. S. C. 1441 (c). For an exhaustive discussion of the new section
1441 (c) see, 19 A. L. R. 2d 748-762.
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In order to understand the implications and changes wrought by
the new act, a discussion of the separable controversy basis for
removal should be discussed and understood.
Background of the New Act.
The old act was former section 71, Title 28, of the United
States Code. It read:
"And when in any suit mentioned in this section there shall be
a controversy which is wholly between citizens of different
States, and which can be fully determined as between them,
then either one or more of the defendants actually interested
in such controversy may remove said suit into the district
court of the United States for the proper district."
A reading of the section discloses that a separable controversy
basis for removal depended upon diversity of citizenship alone,
and that such diversity included only citizens of different states.
The diversity grants with respect to aliens and the state as parties
were not included. The statute shows, that in the determination
of the existence or non-existence of a separable controversy, the
status of the parties involved resolved the question, to wit, the
defendant involved must have been of citizenship diverse to that
of the plaintiff's, and the other defendants must not have been
indispensable parties to the controversy the non-resident defend-
ant is seeking to remove. If a party was an indispensable one
and his presence in the suit destroyed diversity, the suit was not
removable. The case of Ford v. Adkins will illustrate this point.17°
It was a suit in equity for the reformation of a deed against the
present holders of the land and their grantor whose citizenship
destroyed complete diversity. The case was removable since the
presence of the grantor was not only not indispensable but wholly
unnecessary.
Whether or not a separable controversy existed so as to
support removal jurisdiction, was determined from an analysis of
the complaint without any reference to the defendant's plea to
the merits. The plaintiff had a right to control his action, and
absent a fraudulent joinder, his desire was determinate. The
complaint was measured by its subject matter and the object
sought by the plaintiff, and if by these measurements no separable
controversy existed, then there existed no jurisdiction for re-
moval.1'7 1 If defendants were charged with negligence, and the
170 Ford v. Adkins, 39 F. Supp. 472 (1941). For a full treatment of the
old "separable controversy" rule and its application see, 5 LRA (NS) 58-59.
171 Bachman v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 80 F. Supp. 976 (1948).
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charge against the non-resident was of a several nature, or no
joint liability was all alleged, removal by the non-resident de-
fendant should have prevailed. On the other hand, if the defend-
ants were sued jointly, in good faith, removal was not available,
no matter that the non-resident defendant could have been sued
separately.172 There exists the possibility that the defendants
were only severally liable, but the determination of that question
was one of merits and not one of jurisdiction. Hence, the plain-
tiff's interpretation of his rights against the defendant provided
the determinate if there were no fraudulent joinder. A good in-
stance of a fraudulent joinder is found in Wecker v. National
Enameling and S. Co. which was a personal injury action brought
in a state court against two defendants, one of whom was of the
same citizenship as the plaintiff. 173 The plaintiff in the course of
his employment fell into a vat of boiling oil. He contended, among
other things, that the defendants were negligent in failing to pro-
vide safety equipment to safeguard him. The non-resident filed a
petition for removal alleging a separable controversy. The resi-
dent defendant was a draftsman who had drawn the plans, pur-
suant to directions, for the vat. The court held him to be a com-
pletely unnecessary party to the action, and that his joinder was
for the sole purpose of preventing removal.
Shades of the Hum case also plagued the courts in the de-
termination as to the existence of a separable controversy. If the
facts as stated by the complaint showed the violation of only one
right, then only one cause of action existed. The qualm as against
each party to this one cause of action was a controversy. This
controversy was the only proper subject for removal by authority
of the separable controversy statute. If the facts as stated by the
complaint showed the violation of multiple rights, then there ex-
isted multiple causes of action. These separate causes of action
were not separable controversies and sought their removal outside
the authority of the separable controversy statute. Of course
these separate causes of action, individually, could have con-
tained therein a controversy which was removable.
This distinction between separate causes of action and sepa-
rable controversies found expression in the practice of the re-
moval of the whole cause of action, in which a separable contro-
172 Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U. S. 534 (1938).
173 Wecker v. National Enameling & S. Co., 204 U. S. 176 (1906).
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versy took place, to the federal courts.174 If the suit contained a
separable controversy, the entire suit could be removed. If the
suit contained several causes of action, only those causes of action
containing a separable controversy could be removed; the other
cause or causes were left remaining in the state court. The case of
Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Felt illustrates this
practice. 175 It was an action for the death of one Felt, who was
crushed to death by a bulldozer which he operated. The facts of
the accident and the circumstances under which Felt was em-
ployed posed a question as to for whom of three employers Felt
was working when the accident occurred. Because of this, three
workmen's compensation insurance carriers in the alternative
were sued. The citizenship of one of the carriers was the same as
that of the plaintiffs. The non-resident insurers' petitioned for
removal and the whole case was removed to the federal court.
The removal of the suit as against the resident insurance carrier
was objected to on the ground that the removal could not affect
a cause of action having a non-federal basis. Said the court:
"If there were three separate suits in a single proceeding, the
action should have been divided, two removed to the federal
court, and one left in the State court; if there were three
controversies in one suit, as we think, the entire suit was
removable." 176
The court reasoned that the plaintiff was seeking to enforce one
contractual right, and that the issue in the suit was the fixing of
the liability or non-liability for that right pursuant to the facts and
circumstances of the case, irrespective of the number of parties
included therein.
174 "In observing the distinction between a suit which is removable in its
entirety on the ground of a separable controversy wholly between citizens
of different states, and which can fully determine as between them, and one
where separate and unrelated causes of action are joined in the same com-
plaint, it is interesting to note the play of similar principles when juris-
diction depends upon a substantial federal question, as an integral part of
the plaintiff's case, though there be other non-federal questions involved.
In such case, under both original and removal jurisdiction, the federal
court will decide all issues necessary for decision, whether they be local or
federal, and even though the.federal question is not decided at all; but the
rule does not go so far as to permit a federal court to assume jurisdiction
of a separate and distinct cause of action because it is joined in the same
complaint with one involving a federal question." Holmes, Edsin R., "The
Separable Controversy-A Federal Removal Concept," 1939, 12 Mississippi
Law Journal 163, 170.
175 Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n. v. Felt, 150 F. 2d 227 (1945).
176 Ibid., p. 232.
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The New Act.
Section 1441 (c), Title 28 of the United States Code abolished
the separable controversy as a basis for removal. Now only
separate and independent claims or causes of action form the
basis for removal jurisdiction by cutting out the ground of sepa-
rable controversies to support removal. 177 When the bill was pro-
posed, it met stiff opposition from academic circles. Their dislike
for the bill was premised upon the nebulous conceptions existing
in the courts as to the distinction between separate and separable
controversies.178 To them, the confusion which reigned by reason
of the Hum doctrine was about to be endorsed by the legislature.
Also, if Congress felt that the volume of judicial business was too
much for the federal court, the answer lay in the increase in
federal facilities to handle this volume rather than in a decrease in
jurisdiction.1 7 9
In many respects, the new act is similar to the old separable
controversy act.'80 Removability under the new act still depends
177 Congressional Revision Committee Report on the new removal statute,
section 1441: "The accompanying committee report has this to say: 'It ...
permits the removal of a separate cause of action but not of a separable
controversy unless it constitutes a separate and independent claim or cause
of action within the original jurisdiction of United States District Courts.
In this respect it will somewhat decrease the volume of Federal litigation.'"
Keefe, Arthur John and Lacey, Frederick B., "The Separable Controversy-
A Federal Concept," 1948, 33 Cornell Law Quarterly 261, 269, 270.
178 Ibid., p. 270: "It is believed that the selection of words is unfortunate.
The courts for years have been unable to distinguish clearly between
'separate' and 'separable.' Yet this bill requires that a distinction be drawn.
Nothing in the proposed bill will aid the judges in drawing the line be-
tween the two."
179 Ibid: "Do we want a reduction in the volume of litigation in the
federal courts if it has to be secured in this manner? Undeniably the
federal calendars are overcrowded, but it is suggested that we should have
more federal judges, rather than less federal jurisdiction, to solve the
problem."
180 "Under the new Judicial Code, separable controversies were abolished,
as a distinct ground of federal removal jurisdiction, and Section 1441 (c) of
said code was substituted in lieu thereof. The separable controversy was
uprooted, but the soil in which it flourished remains. The difference between
the two concepts is one of degree, not of kind; and the basic principles are as
applicable now as they were under prior statutes. We are still governed by
the local law as to the plaintiff's substantive right and the joint or several
character of his claim. The federal authorities are still potent to the effect
that the plaintiff has the right to select the forum; to elect whether to sue
joint tort-feasors jointly or separately; and to prosecute his own suit in his
own way to a final determination. They are also potent to the effect that,
if the complaint is filed in good faith, the cause of action, for the purpose of
removal, is deemed to be that which the plaintiff has undertaken to make
it; that the defendant cannot make separate a cause of action which the
plaintiff has elected to make joint; and the same is true as to all other
questions with respect to federal jurisdiction and the statutory remedy of
removal." Bentley v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 174 F. 2d 788,
791 (1949).
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upon the original jurisdiction of the federal court, in that the
cause of action or claim, to be removed, must have been one that
could have been brought in the federal court in the first instance.
Under the old act, the controversy to be removable, had to con-
tain the element of complete diversity whereas under the new
act a claim posing a federal question is removable regardless of
the citizenship of the parties. In this respect, the new act is
broader than the provisions of the old act. The plaintiff is still
the master of his complaint, and the determination as to whether
there exists one or more claims or causes of action which can
support removal is found in the reading thereof, unfettered by the
allegations of the defendant. As in the application of the old act,
the state law still dictates the plaintiff's substantive rights, and
whether or not a single or multiple causes of action are pleaded
are resolved by state law.' 5 ' The new act allows a removal of a
cause of action or claim where, had it been sued upon alone, it
would have been removable. This means that pursuant to the
general requirements of removal, all of the defendants must join
in the removal petition. Under the old act, if the requisite di-
versity existed in the controversy "either one or more of the de-
fendants" could have removed. Unlike the old act, once a claim or
cause of action is successfully removed under the new act, all of
the claims or causes of action joined therewith may be removed,
and claims having a federal and a non-federal basis alike, may be
determined in the federal courts. Considerations of justice, ex-
pense and dispatch are weighed in the retention of the entire
suit.18 2
The new act then, deals only in separate and independent
claims or causes of action. It involves not the joinder of parties
but rather the joinder of causes of action or claims. The yardstick
in the application of the new act is the number of violated rights
revealed by the facts; one violated right, one cause of action,
181 Billups v. American Surety Co., 87 F. Supp. 894 (1950).
182 In a case wherein a complaint brought in a state court stated eleven
causes of action, five of which were triable in the federal court, and having
the requisite diversity and jurisdictional amount, the federal court refused
a motion to remand the remaining six non-federal causes of action saying:
"The Congress having made this possible in the discretion of the court,
by this very substantial change in the statute, upon reconsideration, the
court has determined that more is to be gained in the expeditious and less
expensive administration of justice, and no legal rights will be violated, if
the original motion were denied in toto, and so it will be." McFadden v.
Grace Lines Inc., 82 F. Supp. 494, 495 (1948).
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multiple violated rights, multiple causes of action.18 3 If there is
but the violation of one right, then any interest that bears the
semblance of being several is in reality a separable controversy
no longer removable.1s4 Even in instances where the plaintiff
charges the defendant with only several liability or liability in
the alternative, if there is but one injury, there are no separate
and independent claims or causes of action to validate removal.1s 5
The American Fire and Casualty Co. v. Finn Case.
The American Fire and Casualty Company v. Finn case,
hereinafter referred to as the Finn case, presents a good picture of
the judicial attitudes under discussion with reference to the ap-
plication of the new act.18 6 The case is peculiar in that it involves
a repudiation by a non-resident of his own removal after judg-
ment goes against him. It also gives an indication as to how rigid
the courts will be in the interpretation of this new act. The
plaintiff, a citizen of Texas, brought this suit in a state court for a
fire loss, against a Florida insurance corporation, an Indiana in-
surance corporation, and one, Reiss, the local agent of both cor-
porations and a citizen of Texas. The plaintiff alleged that one or
the other company, through its agent, insured the property
damaged, and that the agent was responsible for anything that
would defeat the plaintiff's recovery. The case was removed
and a motion to remand the case back to the state court was
denied. A judgment was rendered on the merits against one of
the insurance companies. This company then moved to vacate
the judgment for lack of diversity jurisdiction. The logic of this
company was that the plaintiff had suffered the violation of one
right, to wit, the breach of an insurance contract, and that because
of this, there was no separate and distinct cause of action under
the act to authorize removal, therefore the federal court had no
jurisdiction because one of the other defendants destroyed com-
plete diversity. The supreme court agree, that but a single wrong,
emanating from a series of interlocked transactions, was pleaded
183 Rodewald v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 91 F. Supp. 700 (1950); Burns v.
Carolina Power & Light Co., 88 F. Supp. 767 (1950); Harward v. General
Motors Corporation, 89 F. Supp. 170 (1950); Willoughby v. Sinclair Oil &
Gas Co., 89 F. Supp. 994 (1950).
184 Buckholt v. Dow Chemical Co., 81 F. Supp. 463 (1948).
185 Butler Mfg. Co. v. Wallace & Tiernan Sales Corp., 82 F. Supp. 635 (1948).
186 American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U. S. 6 (1950).
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by the plaintiff; that wrong being the failure to compensate the
plaintiff for his loss in the property. In a very strict interpreta-
tion of the new act, the majority opinion held that the district
court lacked jurisdiction to have a trial on the merits. This is
indeed a Denial attitude.
The dissenting opinion of the Finn case by Justice Douglas is
an Active one. He was of the conviction that since the removing
defendant asked for and obtained removal of the case to the dis-
trict court, and lost its case therein, it was estopped from having
it remanded to the state court. To go further, Justice Douglas
reasoned that the suit against the removing defendant was one
which could have been brought originally in the federal district
court, there having been present the requisite diversity and juris-
dictional amount. Also, the judgment under review, involved
only the removing defendant and no other. Only the bare circum-
stance of the removing defendant having invoked the federal dis-
trict court's jurisdiction, was offensive to that court's jurisdiction.
In Activist language, Justice Douglas concluded:
"I think it is abusive of the interests of justice when the chal-
lenge now made is raised to the dignity of a jurisdictional
question. Any requirement of section 1441 (c) that was not
met in this case rose to no level higher than an irregularity,
so far as petitioner is concerned." 187
The holding in this Finn case indicates that the courts intend to
adhere to the letter of the law in the interpretation and applica-
tion of the new act. If the court ever intended to relax the rule of
the new act this Finn case was an inviting occasion. A situation
like this cries out for Judicial Activism. The Denial answer to
Justice Douglas informs, that the defendant did not obtain re-
moval because the court had not jurisdiction to retain the case in
the first instance. Since the court had no jurisdiction, the judg-
ment even if only against the petitioner was ineffectual. Besides,
it's no revelation that the consent of the parties cannot confer
jurisdiction upon the federal courts, if jurisdiction is otherwise
lacking. Perhaps, after the new act and its effect is allowed time
to jell in the judicial mind and opinion, some credence will be
given to the Douglas viewpoint. At present the test of the new
act reaches confusing proportions which, perhaps, ought not to
be made more complex with new and equitable applications.
187 Ibid., p. 19.
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COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS.
In Defense of the Separable Controversy as the Basis for
Removal Jurisdiction.
What has been said in favor of the need for diversity jurisdic-
tion also supports the need for removal jurisdiction. Be there no
doubt that defendants likewise can suffer indignations of local
bias, prejudice and policy. It is established that, historically, re-
moval jurisdiction had its inception in the desire to protect the
defendant. Of some repute is the idea that this protection cur-
rently has a practical basis. Should the scope of that protection be
lessened because the plaintiff pleads one cause of action? Rights
and liabilities grow out of relationships between people. The
disturbance of a fixed relationship or a contracted relationship
may give rise to a right and a correlative liability. Freedom is a
relationship that's defined by people's responsibility to each other.
Law defines the relationships of people, fixes the relationships of
people and conforms the relationships of people. In justice and in
reason, it seems that the scope of removal jurisdiction should de-
pend upon the relationship of the parties to each other and to the
plaintiff. A claim or cause of action is but the projected result of
a breach in the relationships between people. Why should it
precede the event from which it originated, in importance? If a
party, in his relative position, can remove a suit, within the con-
fines of the original jurisdiction of the federal district court, with-
out disturbing the interests of the other parties to the suit, he
should be allowed to remove. If his liability grew out of a rela-
tionship, why should not his right to absolve that liability also
grow out of a relationship? To this end, the separable controversy
ground for removal jurisdiction seems, as a matter of jurispru-
dence, the better practice. This separable controversy ground
should be augmented with the allowance of removal in federal
question cases irrespective of citizenship. With the developments
in modern methods for travel and communications, boundary lines
become mythical, and space presents little problems. The rela-
tionships between people transcend space and boundary lines, and
become more national in scope. A ship strike in San Francisco
has an economic and dietary effect in New York. These national
relationships cause an increase in the judicial business of the
national courts. This increase should not be met with a restric-
tion upon the allowable federal jurisdiction. Rather, the solution
should be met by an extension of the facilities in the national
courts, as already previously suggested.
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The Personality of Removal Jurisdiction.
Elusive is one of the terms that may be used in describing
the personality of removal jurisdiction. If, more than one party
defendant is joined in an action, whether removal jurisdiction
will attach is a conjectural matter depending upon the facts and
circumstances surrounding the suit. Since removal jurisdiction is
confined to the original jurisdiction of the federal district courts,
it, as a personality, must conform to the rule of the Gully case in
federal question cases and the various rules as to citizenship in
diversity cases. No doubt this galaxy of rules frustrate and in-
hibit the personality of removal jurisdiction. The separate and in-
dependent claim or cause of action rule as a basis for removal,
coupled with the courts' indicated strict and rigid adherence to
this rule obstructs any liberal tendency this personality may have
contained. These prohibitions imposed upon an already Con-
gressionally inhibited personality fracture its stability so as to
make it the most repressed and limited personality of the group
under discussion. Any receptive potential which this personality
of removal jurisdiction may have is confounded by the network
maze of conceptions of rights and the facts which affect these
rights.
JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT.
Congress has further restricted the original jurisdiction of the
federal district courts by the imposition of a jurisdictional amount
in federal question and diversity cases.' 8 Only when "the matter
in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $3,000, exclusive of
interest and costs" can the jurisdiction of the federal courts be
invoked in the two aforementioned circumstances, except wherein
Congress has provided otherwise189
How Ascertained.
How then is the presence of a proper jurisdictional amount
ascertained? Usually the sum claimed by the plaintiff, in good
faith, is decisive. Again the plaintiff is the master of his com-
plaint. Allegations of the sum involved in the suit as contained in
the complaint are controlling unless the defendant can show to a
legal certainty that the plaintiff can not recover more than
188 See, 28 U. S. C. 1331, 1332.
189 See, 28 U. S. C. 1333, 1334, 1338.
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$3,000.190 Even if it is apparent on the face of the complaint, that
a valid defense exists to the claim, the plaintiff's allegation as to
the amount prevails. In a suit to recover an amount, part of
which is not yet due and discernible upon the face of the com-
plaint, the amount alleged obtains.91 However, if the complaint,
on its face, discloses that the plaintiff cannot recover the amount
alleged, the jurisdictional amount is lacking, and a mere ad
demnum clause will not afford jurisdiction. Illustrative of this
rule is the case of North American Transportation and Trading
Co. v. Morrison, wherein the plaintiff brought a suit for damages
arising out of the breach of a contract to transport the plaintiff
and his baggage from Seattle, Washington to a city in Canada.19 2
The trip to Canada was never completed because of unforeseen
circumstances. The plaintiff alleged in support of the required
jurisdictional amount the fare he paid, expenses incurred in hav-
ing to return to Seattle, the wages which he could have earned
at Seattle had he not proceeded on the abortive journey, the loss
of his baggage, and the failure on the part of the defendant to
carry him to Canada where he could have obtained employment,
thereby causing the loss of wages for a year. All of these allega-
tions totaled up to the required jurisdictional amount. It can be
seen by the very allegations which the plaintiff makes with ref-
erence to wages to be earned in Canada, that the damages suf-
fered thereof are at most remote and speculative, and as a matter
of law are not even to be considered. This is how the court so
held in denying jurisdiction to the plaintiff's cause because of the
lack of the required jurisdictional amount. By way of dictum,
the court held that the failure of a plaintiff to recover less than
the jurisdictional amount in no way indicates a lack of a required
jurisdictional amount.
Plaintiff's Viewpoint Rule.
This right of the plaintiff to determine the amount in con-
troversy is defined by what is known as the plaintiff's viewpoint
rule. 193 This rule makes the test for determining the amount in
190 St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U. S. 283 (1937).
191 Schunk v. Moline, Milburn & Stoddart Co., 147 U. S. 500 (1892).
192 North American Transportation & T. Co., v. Morrison, 178 U. S. 262
(1899).
193 For a discussion of the growth of the plaintiff's viewpoint rule see,
Dobie, Armstead M., "Jurisdictional Amount In The United States District
Court," 1925, 38 Harvard Law Review 733, 740-743.
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controversy, the pecuniary result to either party which a judg-
ment would produce. 1, 4 The rule was not always so broad as it
is stated above. The first classic expression of the rule is found
in the case of Mississippi and M. R. Co. v. Ward which was a
suit to abate a nuisance. 195 The plaintiff claimed the defendant
created a nuisance by building a bridge across the river navigated
by the plaintiff's three steamboats. The plaintiff sought no dam-
ages which made the determination as to the amount in con-
troversy problematical. The court held that the absence of
money damage was not fatal, and that the matter of controversy
was the removal of the bridge which would involve more than
the jurisdictional amount. The value of the object of the suit was
the standard.196 This case considered only the value to be af-
forded the plaintiff. In holding the removal of the bridge as the
determinate, the court was thinking in terms of the plaintiff
navigating the river with his three steamboats, unfettered by the
presence of the bridge, and not in terms of the cost and loss to the
defendant in removing the bridge. In Cowell v. City Water Sup-
ply Co. 19 v the court held the amount in controversy to be the
value sought to be recovered by the plaintiff, or the value which
the defendant stood to lose if the plaintiff is successful. This
court considered the detriment to the defendant in determining
the amount in controversy. Some more recent cases have adhered
to the Cowell case. The Cowell case has in a sense prostituted the
plaintiff's viewpoint rule. The value sought by the plaintiff may
not reach jurisdictional requirements, while the value the de-
fendant will lose if the plaintiff is successful, may far exceed the
jurisdictional amount. In that event, the amount in controversy
is being measured from the defendant's viewpoint and not the
plaintiff's viewpoint. Suffice it to say that the courts have de-
veloped a dual measurement to determine the amount in con-
troversy. It would seem that the broad interpretation of the rule
is more indicative of the amount actually in dispute. No doubt,
each party to a suit thinks in terms of the effect that the outcome
of the suit will have upon his interests, and he proceeds in the
suit with that in mind. To each party the amount in controversy
194 Ronzio v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 116 F. 2d 604 (1940); Shipe v.
Floral Hills, 86 F. Supp. 985 (1949).
195 Mississippi & Missouri R. R. Co. v. Ward, 67 U. S. 485 (1862).
196 See, Glenwood L. & W. Co. v. Mutual L. H. & P. Co., 239 U. S. 121
(1915).
197 Cowell v. City Water Supply Co., 121 F. 53 (1903).
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is. that amount representing his interests. Why then, should not
the determination as to the amount in controversy comprehend
both the interests of the plaintiff and the interests of the defend-
ant? This broad interpretation of the rule which takes into ac-
count the pecuniary result to either party is an Activist product,
and as such favors jurisdiction.
The plaintiff's viewpoint rule cannot anticipate the collateral
effects of a judgment to make up the jurisdictional amount. That
the probative effect of a judgment may result in a loss or gain far
in excess of the jurisdictional amount is not sufficient to satisfy
the jurisdictional amount requirement. The fact that an award
to a landlord of an increase in maximum rent, if upheld, will in-
crease the value of his premises three and a half times, does not
increase the claims of the plaintiffs seeking to enjoin that award
three and a half times so as to meet the jurisdictional amount
standard. 198 Neither does the fact that a judgment, awarding an
insured totally disabled plaintiff the sum of $50.00 per month,
under an insurance contract, may result in the collection from
the defendant insurance company of a sum greatly exceeding the
jurisdictional amount, meet the requirements thereof. 199 In both
of these instances the amount in controversy is the amount due
and accrued to the plaintiffs involved. In a suit to enjoin the col-
lection of a tax, the amount in controversy is the amount of tax
that is due, and not the pecuniary probabilities of its enforcement
or non-enforcement. Since the payment of the tax would quiet
these probabilities, it is the only matter in dispute.200 To be dis-
tinguished is an instance where a statute is challenged as a re-
striction of business without reference to the payment of a tax.
In this event, the right to do business is the matter in controversy
and the pecuniary result from its suppression is the amount in
controversy.20 1
Recent Application of the Plaintiff's Viewpoint Rule.
Since the plaintiff's viewpoint rule is the keynote to jurisdic-
tional amount, it would be well to illustrate some recent applica-
tions of that rule. In the case of Ronzio v. Denver and R. G. W. R.
Co. a suit was brought to quiet title to water rights and to deter-
198 Spieler v. Hass, 79 F. Supp. 835 (1948).
199 Button v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 48 F. Supp. 168 (1943).
200 Healy v. Ratta, 292 U. S. 263 (1933).
201 Ibid.
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mine priorities under these rights.20 2 The plaintiffs asked for
damages amounting to $1,000, and a decree quieting title. The
defendant removed the cause and the plaintiff filed a motion to
remand on the ground that the requisite jurisdictional amount
was lacking to support the jurisdiction of the federal court. The
court held that the matter in controversy was the object sought
by the plaintiff through his complaint, and that the test for de-
termining the amount in controversy was the pecuniary result to
either party which the judgment would produce. The court in
applying these premises reasoned that the object of the plaintiff's
suit was to establish the validity and priority of his water rights
over those claimed by the defendant, and if a judgment were
given in the plaintiff's favor it would establish the defendant's
rights as secondary, and thereby destroy its value and "result in
a pecuniary loss" far in excess of the jurisdictional amount. Thus
the amount in controversy was sufficient to satisfy the jurisdic-
tional requirements. The case of Shipe v. Floral Hills is a similar
holding.20 3 In this case, the plaintiff brought a class action to
secure the appointment of a receiver to take over all the property
and assets of the defendant so as to fulfill the contractual obliga-
tions incurred by the defendant, and arising out of the sale of
burial plots made to the plaintiff and his class. According to con-
tract, the defendant was to establish an irrevocable trust fund
of at least ten percent of the gross amount received from the sale
of all the lots sold in Floral Hill Cemetery. The plaintiff alleged
that the defendant had sold over one million dollars worth of
lots, and had not deposited more than $50,000 in the trust fund.
The court held that the value of the object of the suit was by rea-
son of the trust fund, the $50,000, and that if the defendant were
obligated to set up the trust fund as alleged, the pecuniary result
to him would be a liability of $50,000, which indeed satisfies
jurisdictional requirements. In both these cases, the pecuniary re-
sult which the defendant might suffer determined the amount in
controversy. Both of these cases also have a two step approach
in determining the amount in controversy. First, the object of
the suit as pleaded by the plaintiff is ferreted out. This is termed
the matter in controversy. Second, the pecuniary result to either
party which a final determination of this matter in controversy
would produce is ascertained, and this is resolved as the amount
202 Ronzio v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 116 F. 2d 604 (1940).
203 Shipe v. Floral Hills, 86 F. Supp. 985 (1949).
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in controversy. This amount in controversy is allowed two
chances to make the grade. If the pecuniary result to the plaintiff
is insufficient, then resort is had to the pecuniary result to the
defendant. In the first case it was stipulated that the value of the
plaintiff's water rights was not in excess of '$2,000, so that there
was no doubt as to the amount in controversy from the plaintiff's
viewpoint. Nevertheless, the court considered the pecuniary in-
terest of the defendant, and held his interest as the amount in
controversy. It is apparent that the plaintiff's viewpoint rule is
no longer confined to the plaintiff's point of view.
ANCILLARY JURISDICTION.
By reasons of necessity and expedience, there has emanated
from the constitutionally authorized grants of jurisdiction, a type
of jurisdiction that has no express constitutional, or congressional
sanction, termed ancillary jurisdiction. Strictly speaking, an-
cillary jurisdiction is not a jurisdiction, in the sense that it does
not find its authority, as does the other phases of jurisdiction,
in the dictates of Congress. Like removal jurisdiction, ancillary
jurisdiction depends upon a previously authorized exercise of
jurisdiction and it exists solely by dint of a relationship thereto.
When standing alone, ancillary jurisdiction and the exercise there-
of may violate the limitations of the constitution. However, it
finds its "raison d'etre" as a jurisdictional vehicle for proceedings
incidental or supplemental to the main claim. It is a jurisdiction
in aid of the principal proceedings and depends upon the principal
proceedings for its efficacy.
The evolution of ancillary jurisdiction has been espoused of
many concepts ranging from the desire to protect property al-
ready within the jurisdiction of the court to the desire to do
justice to all matters relating to the claim currently before the
court. Since the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction
and the exercise of their jurisdiction was and is always under
scrutiny, there have been attempts to ascribe definitive aspects
to the scope of ancillary jurisdiction. Perhaps the most inclusive
of these attempts is one that assigns the exercise of ancillary
jurisdiction to two classes of proceedings. 204 One class includes
those proceedings which affect the property already in the cus-
tody or control of the court. The other class includes those pro-
ceedings which deal with the processes, pleadings, judgments or
204 Cooperative Transit Co. v. West Penn. Electric Co., 132 F. 2d 720 (1943).
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records of the court in the principal case. The scope of ancillary
jurisdiction was not always as broad as the aforementioned
classes of proceedings might indicate. At first, the reasons as-
signed for the exercise of an ancillary jurisdiction had their basis
in the possession by the court of a res which was the focal point
of the controversy. This possession of the res coupled with the
need to do complete justice in the final disposition of that res
among all the parties having an interest therein effected ancillary
jurisdiction. 20 5 Also among the earlier reasons assigned for the
exercise of ancillary jurisdiction, was the necessity to make ef-
fective the orders, judgments and decrees of the courts. A perusal
of the opinions dealing with ancillary jurisdiction will reveal that
the courts will readily take jurisdiction of proceedings incidental
to the main claim which involve property, and such property is in
the possession of the court, irrespective of whether the proceed-
ing is one which may not have been legally within the original
cognizance of the federal court. It is also elementary that an-
cillary jurisdiction will operate to aid the execution or effectuate
a judgment already entered in a suit.20 6
The case of Compton v. Jesup is the early authority for the
exercise of ancillary jurisdiction. 20 7 It was a suit brought in a
federal court to foreclose one of several mortgages held upon a
railway system. The railway system was sold under foreclosure
decrees but the property was not ordered to be turned over to the
purchasers, leaving the property still in the possession of the re-
ceivers. While this property was still in the receivers' possession,
mortgagees under a prior mortgage began a suit in the same
court to foreclose their mortgages. Numerous persons having
interests or claims in the property, and whose citizenship de-
stroyed complete diversity, were made parties to the second suit.
The court admitted that it did not have original jurisdiction over
the second foreclosure suit, but held that it was not a suit, but in
essence a proceeding ancillary to the main foreclosure suit. It
reasoned that no other court, except that court wherein the re-
ceivers were appointed could give the first mortgagees relief, be-
cause no other court could wrest the present court of possession
205 Fulton National Bank v. Hozier, 267 U. S. 276 (1924).
206 In re Maryland Coal Co. of West Virginia, 36 F. Supp. 142 (1941); Hume
v. City of New York, 255 F. 488 (1918); Union Trust Co. v. Jones, 16 F. 2d
236 (1926); Ferguson v. Omaha, 227 F. 513 (1915); Oklahoma v. Texas, 258
U. S. 574 (1921); Barnett v. Mayes, 43 F. 2d 521 (1930).
207 Compton v. Jesup, 68 F. 263 (1895).
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of the property, decree it to be sold and deliver to the purchaser a
clear title. Because of that unfettered possession the court had
inherent ancillary power to hear and decide upon all claims upon
the property in its possession. Appended to this reasoning was
the premise that every court had "inherent equitable power" to
control its proceedings, so that its judgments and decrees will not
cause injustice to any person. This case places the emphasis on
the presence of a res in the claim, and the possession of that res,
actually or constructively, in the court, and to that effect it is the
present authority.20 8 The case also intimates, and very strongly,
that a court may have ancillary jurisdiction to effectuate a judg-
ment already entered in a suit. Currently there is much authority
on these two phases of the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction. They
are deemed, as a matter of necessity, inherent judicial powers.
Of later origin is the idea that ancillary jurisdiction admitted
of procedural matters.20 9 The reasons assigned for the exercise of
ancillary jurisdiction in procedural matters are convenience and
the desire to do complete justice to all the persons who are or
may be affected by the claim and the facts surrounding it.210 One
of the more important procedural expressions of ancillary juris-
diction is found in the third party practice of the federal district
208 Compare the case of Cooperative Transit Co. v. West Penn. Electric Co.,
132 F. 2d 720 (1943), wherein the purchaser of property in a foreclosure
proceeding brought an action claiming that certain barns were within the
after acquired property clause of the mortgage under which he purchased.
The barn property had never been before the court, nor had it been the
subject of litigation in the foreclosure action. The parties who were
brought in alleged they were bona fide purchasers of the bar property and
their citizenship destroyed diversity.
209 "It is true that the ancillary jurisdiction of the federal courts in the
sense that the term is used here is most frequently based on the possession
of a res, and the necessity of doing complete justice in its final disposition
among all parties interested; or in supplementary proceedings necessary to
make effective the orders, judgments and decrees of the court. The type
of suit we are here dealing with is, of course, not a suit in rem but in
personam; but it is by no means certain that the nature of ancillary juris-
diction must be limited to a case where the court has possession of a res,
or a supplementary proceeding to enforce a valid judgment. We are here
dealing with procedural matters only, and there is very substantial ground
for the view that as the general jurisdiction of the court properly attached
under constitutional and statutory provisions to the suit between the original
plaintiff and the original defendant, it should proceed to do final and com-
plete justice as between all parties affected by or liable on account of the
same set of facts." Tullgren v. Jasper, 27 F. Supp. 413, 417 (1939).
210 "These rules are a part of that fundamental tenet of modern procedure
that joinder of parties and of claims must be greatly liberalized to provide at
least for the effective settlement at one time of all disputes of which parts
are already before the court." Lesnik v. Public Industrials Corporation,
144 F. 2d 968, 973 (1944).
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courts, as found in rule 14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Rule permits a defendant to serve a summons and complaint upon
a person not a party to the action, but who is or may be liable to
the defendant for all or part of the claim the plaintiff asserts
against the defendant. The original defendant is then termed a
third party plaintiff and the new defendant is termed a third
party defendant. The rule gives the third party defendant the
same impleading rights that the original defendant has.2 11 The
original plaintiff has impleading rights to the same extent when
a counterclaim is asserted against him. This rule allows the
federal district court to take cognizance over claims of which it
could not take originally, because the claim against the impleaded
party may lack the jurisdictional amount or because the citizen-
ship of the third party defendant may destroy diversity. The
jurisdictional intendments of this rule is implemented by an-
cillary jurisdiction. Unlike the clear cut cases of ancillary juris-
diction where a res is present, proper jurisdiction in third party
practice cases requires more thought manipulation. Neither is the
application of the rule as liberal in the invocation of ancillary
jurisdiction as found in rem proceedings.
Under the third party practice if the jurisdiction of the
court over the original claim is based on diversity of citizenship,
that jurisdiction is not lost because other parties whose citizen-
ship is objectionable, are subsequently impleaded into the case. 212
However, that impleader must essentially take the form of an in-
cidental or ancillary proceeding. To put it another way, the de-
fendant by impleading a third party defendant, cannot subtly
change the plaintiff's claim so as to be a claim against the third
party defendant.213 For a claim to be ancillary or incidental, the
third party plaintiff must seek to recover from the third party de-
fendant upon a secondary liability which arises out of the plain-
tiff's claim against the original defendant.2 14 In an action by a
Georgia resident for injuries sustained in an automobile collision,
the defendant filed a third party complaint upon two Georgia resi-
dents claiming them to be liable to the plaintiff in the original
defendant's stead. The court held that the defendant was at-
211 See, Nora v. Pittston Stevedoring Corporation, 90 F. Supp. 35 (1950); a
case where a motion was granted permitting a 4th party defendant to im-
plead a 5th party defendant.
212 Johnson v. G. J. Shenard Co., 2 FRD 164 (1941).
213 Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Saunders, 159 F. 2d 481 (1947).
214 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vallendingham, 94 F. Supp. 17 (1950).
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tempting to substitute a new and separate claim for the plaintiff,
and the original defendant was not asserting a right to indemnity
so as to make the suit an ancillary one.2 15 The courts have just
about narrowed down claims considered as ancillary to a main
claim, to claims wherein the third party plaintiff claims a right to
indemnity, or a right to contribution or a right to subrogation. 216
Other claims by the third party plaintiff have to stand the original
jurisdictional test of the federal courts, and ancillary jurisdiction
is unavailing.
COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS.
A Judicial Activist Innovation.
Ancillary jurisdiction in the federal courts by its very nature
owes its existence to Judicial Activism. It is not traceable to any
one of the nine constitutional grants of jurisdiction, nor has it any
statutory recognition. To go further, ancillary jurisdiction is a
means used by the courts which even violates the constitutional
confinements. Each extension of the idea of ancillary jurisdiction
is an Activist step from the letter of the law and a bane to Judicial
Denial. Ancillary jurisdiction's ultimate authority inheres in the
Judicial Activism components of necessity, justice and expedi-
ence. For whatever ancillary jurisdiction is worth, credit for its
inception and promulgation belongs to the Judicial Activist. It
should be mentioned that there are some Judicial Self Denial
influences evident in the field of ancillary jurisdiction. As pre-
viously discussed, the courts seem constrained to give the third
party practice some semblance of compliance with the original
jurisdiction to the federal district courts. In federal question
cases, the rule of the Hurn case forbids the assumption of a non-
federal cause of action but concedes the jurisdiction for a non-
federal ground. Both of these instances are Denial checks on the
import of ancillary jurisdiction. Perhaps some day power and
authority will come to mean the same as justice, expedience and
necessity; but until that time comes, a fictional jurisdiction to
facilitate these socio-legal cogencies, need be countenanced, un-
der the sponsorship of Judicial Activism and subject to the
vigilance of Judicial Self Denial.
215 Akers Motor Lines v. Newman, 168 F. 2d 1012 (1948).
216 Pearce v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 7 FRD 420 (1946); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Vallendingham, 94 F. Supp. 17 (1950); Lee Inc. v. Transcontinental Under-
writers, 9 FRD 470 (1949).
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Statutory Recognition of Ancillary Jurisdiction.
A passing comment should be made upon the statute relating
to the removal of separate claims or causes of action, and the
authority therein to remove a whole suit involving multiple
causes of action, some of which are non-federal. 217 Could this be
a statutory recognition of ancillary jurisdiction? It must be con-
ceded that Congress has no express constitutional power to allow
the federal courts to take cognizance of a non-federal cause of
action merely because it is joined with a federal cause of action.
Where then, lay the justification for such a grant as given by
Congress to the federal courts? Under the old separable con-
troversy basis for removal, various reasons were assigned in
sanctioning the federal courts' right to determine federal and
non-federal questions in a removed suit, when the constitu-
tionality of such a practice was put in issue. Among these reasons
were the production of proper results, the economical and ex-
peditious administration of justice, the supreme court's indul-
gence in such a practice, the existence of Congressional necessary
and proper powers to execute its Article three, section two
powers, and the ancillary properties of such a practice. 218 The
last of these reasons incorporates most of the others. In any
event, these reasons were acceptable enough to keep the au-
thority for such a practice from being cast into the limbo of the
unconstitutional. It is suggested that Congress was mindful of
this reasoning in authorizing the reception of non-federal causes
of action in the act making separate and independent claims a
basis for removal. Perhaps they felt these reasons and their an-
cillary propensities coupled with the legal contrivance of the
Activist would lend authority to this enactment. Is this, then,
a statutory recognition of ancillary jurisdiction?
Ancillary Jurisdiction and the Personality of the
Original Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts.
Ancillary jurisdiction is not a personality. It has no existence
apart from that which the courts give it. It is an agency enlisted
in aid of the original jurisdiction of the federal district courts. It
is an Activist conceived process used in the development of the
personality of original jurisdiction. A party wishing to have his
217 See, 28 U. S. C. 1441 (c).
218 Hoffman v. Lynch, 23 F. 2d 518 (1928); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n. v.
Felt, 150 F. 2d 227, 233, 234 (1945); Sperry v. Wabash R. Co., 52 F. Supp. 337(1943).
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day in a federal court can invoke either the federal question, or
the diversity or the removal jurisdiction thereof, depending upon
the circumstances of the claim involved. Each of these jurisdic-
tions has its own tenets, and a party may avail himself of one
jurisdiction independent of the other. This he cannot do with
ancillary jurisdiction because ancillary jurisdiction is a facility
and not an entity, capable of having a personality. As a mere
means of application, ancillary jurisdiction itself has no receptive
potential, however, it is able to promote such a potential, which
seems to be its chief province. It tends to militate against some
of the punctilious attitudes of Self Denial.
OBSERVATIONS AND REFLECTIONS.
The Suitor Denies.
The state of the original jurisdiction of the federal courts is
elusive. The law defining that jurisdiction is repelling and ef-
facing. It endorses avoidance of the jurisdiction of the federal
courts and scrutinizes the invocation thereof. There are no in-
genious devices to confer jurisdiction for the use of the suitor,
save that of moving to another state and affecting a citizenship
diverse to that of the intended defendant or defendants. At
least, such a method is expensive and inconvenient. Perhaps,
the dropping of all but indispensable parties to affect diversity of
citizenship may be said, remotely, to confer jurisdiction. On the
other hand, there are numerous recognized devices for avoiding
the jurisdiction of the federal courts by preventing removal. One
such of these devices is the bringing of a suit in a state court for
less than the jurisdictional amount in both federal question and
diversity cases. Such a right is so well countenanced by the
federal courts, that a plaintiff may bring an action in a federal
court, have it dismissed without prejudice, and bring the same
action in the state court for a reduced amount, and thereby
prevent removal.219 Another of these sanctioned devices is the
bringing of an action in a state court for less than the jurisdic-
tional amount, and later increasing the claim by amending it at
the trial.220 In diversity cases, wherein no federal question is in-
volved, a plaintiff may join a resident defendant and plead only
one cause of action to escape removal. Although an assignment
219 Brady v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America, 68 F. 2d 302
(1953); Iowa C. R. Co. v. Bacon, 236 U. S. 305 (1914).
220 Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Austin, 135 U. S. 315 (1889).
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to confer jurisdiction, by creating diversity of citizenship, cannot
do so, one to prevent removal may have, according to state law,
the desired effect.2 2 1 In certain instances, a plaintiff, whose
citizenship will allow removal, may even go so far as to procure
a plaintiff whose citizenship will not allow removal. This was
instanced in Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co.,222 where an ad-
ministratrix, after having her wrongful death action removed to
the federal court, dismissed the action, resigned as administratrix,
and had an administrator of the same citizenship as the defendant
appointed at her request, thereby preventing removal. Since only
a non-resident may remove, a suitor may escape removal, in a
case wherein no federal question is involved, by bringing his
action in a court of the state in which the defendant is a citizen.
As a passing comment, in federal question cases, the plaintiff may
be able to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court under the
less restrictive federal basis concept of the Fair case, but by the
same token the defendant may seek to deny that invocation by
pleading the strict basic question concept of the Gully case. And
so it goes; the law is geared to the denial of litigation in the
federal courts with appreciable participation therein by the
suitors.
From Whence Came the Two Attitudes.
Perhaps the greatest political invention of all time was the
Constitution of the United States. It was assembled by men who
were invested with a dream that reached far and beyond the
contemporary realizations. In that paper they tried to project
all the ambitions that failed them in the mother country. It was
fashioned of ideals considered beyond the reach of mortal man.
It was the precursor to the manifest destiny the Union was later
to realize. It was a canon formulated to serve its adherents for
time immemorial. These qualities, after some one hundred sixty
odd years still obtain. The Constitution is a unique instrument
in that it is plastic and versatile. However, it does not operate of
itself. It depends upon application to become active. It serves as
a guide to facilitate its intended ends. What then are these ends?
To understand these ends, it must be realized that the Con-
stitution was conceived of fragmentary concepts of natural law
existing in England at the time of the exodus into the new
221 Rule 17, Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts;
28 U. S. C. 1359.
222 Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U. S. 183 (1931).
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"promise land." These were the same concepts that were being
successfully resisted in England in favor of the prerogatives of
government. The advent of the industrial revolution had dictated
something more secure than "popular" notions of the rights of
man, if it were to reach a successful inclusion into English so-
ciety. Contractual rights had to be adjusted to the social and
economic changes wrought by the industrial revolution. The
doctrine of laissez faire, which was espoused by those of the
natural law school of thought, was considered as a deterrent to
progress. The lawyers and middle classes of the time wanted
something more practical than a code of personal ethics to guide
the community. As legislatures became more politically secure,
they began to foster nationalism and the allegiance thereto as the
prime consideration in law. The analytical school of thought was
progressively supplanting the natural law influence in England.
Tyrannies infiltrated into the law society. This was the back-
ground for the establishment of the federal government.
The colonists had migrated to America to escape these new
influences. When the Constitution was being formed, the concepts
of natural law rights were utmost in the minds of the framers.
Phrases like "liberty or death" were the order of the day. As a
result, the Constitution was framed under natural law influence.
Of prime consideration was the7 desire to establish effective
limitations upon government and to guarantee the individual his
transcendental rights. With this in mind, the Constitutional Con-
vention emerged with a law symmetrical, containing mechanical
means to facilitate these ends.
Succinctly, the federal government gives credence to three
postulates: the protection of individual "inherent" rights, the pro-
motion of a national government while allowing to the states the
right of local self-government, and a system of governmental
checks and balances. On the national judiciary rests the duty to
make this system work. 223 The judges who first embarked upon
this duty were imbued with the politics of their time, and their
influences in turn were manifested clear up to the beginning of
the twentieth century. 224 Property rights were given a parity
with human rights, corporations were protected with natural law
interpretations of contracts and child labor flourished; slavery
223 Parker, John J., "The Federal Judiciary," 1948, 22 Tulane Law Review
569.
224 Swisher, Carl Brent, American Constitutional Development, 1943, p.
500.
27Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1955
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
was supported by the natural law concept of due process, a slave
was a property right not to be disturbed; natural law limitations
were also imposed upon the police power of the states. These
were the nascent beginnings of Judicial Self Denial. Stare Decisis
reigned on the pretense that uniformity was more important than
justice. These Denial influences with their mechanical interpre-
tations still exist today.
In the early nineteen hundreds, there sprung up a revolt
against these natural law influences and mechanical interpreta-
tions of the law. This revolt was spearheaded by men like
Holmes, Brandeis and Pound. They felt that jurists had a greater
duty to law and country than that of discovery of the law alone.
They reasoned that law was made for man; that it should satisfy
his needs, wants and vicissitudes. Herein was the nascent be-
ginnings of Judicial Activism, although traces of this attitude can
be found in earlier judicial review. To the men of this school
expediency was the keynote. Under them, transitions in the law
"from forms to functions, from concepts to activities, from statics
to dynamics, from individual ends to social ends, from the satis-
faction of intellectual ideals to the satisfaction of human wants"
was the creed.225 According to Pound, law was to adopt its prin-
ciples and doctrines to human conditions, it being an instrument
rather than a factor. He felt that law was to be judged by its
adequacy and not its conformity. The banner of Judicial Activism
was perpetuated by jurists like Stone and Cardozo. Today, men
like Black and Douglas spearhead this school of thought. No
one can deny the progressive imprint these men, and men like
them, have had and have upon the national society. Much of the
currently recognized progressive legislation that these men ju-
dicially supported is a necessary part of the national social and
economic structure today, and of which few deny should be.22 6
In Defense of Judicial Activism.
With scientific, economic and commercial advancements, the
world grows smaller every day. Local interests become inex-
tricably bound with national interests. Local problems have ef-
fect throughout the nation. Interstate commerce reaches into
every home. Folks in California eat apples from the state of
225 Commager, Henry Steele, The American Mind, 1950. p. 375.
226 Commager, Henry Steele, The American Mind, 1950; acknowledgment
is made to this author for much of the material relating to the early political
philosophy of the American government.
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Washington. A bank failure in Chicago affects a Florida citizen.
Many facets of life transcend state boundaries. The law should
become conversant with the needs of the nation. No longer are
there thirteen separate colonies with an independent culture,
society and currency. The old natural law concepts which first
occasioned the constitution are obsolete. There is a new and
greater and stronger economy today. In the law of nations, we are
but a single state and the community of nations grows nearer
every day. Our pledge to the United Nations as a national unit
calls for an exercise of that organization's tenets as a national
unit. Reasons of expedience, nationally and internationally, call
for a new interpretation of human rights and property rights. The
constitution is not a fixed dogma; it depends upon application.
It is not self-effacing. The need for Judicial Activism is apparent
in the benefits already reaped from such a practice. This discus-
sion has sought to point out how Judicial Activism is sometimes
beneficial. Look at the economic implications the Deveaux case
would have espoused if it were not for the Activist rejection of
such a situation. The economy of this country dictates the union
of capital for enterprise. What an injustice would have been per-
petrated if the doors of the national courts were closed to a suitor
because one stockholder, out of a multitude, was of the same
citizenship as that of the suitor. By the same token, a corporation
may have been denied the right to a federal forum because one of
its many stockholders was of the same citizenship as the defend-
ant. True, the state courts were open, but interests, availability,
location, venue, and process may have decreed a broader forum.
History, yes even history, and the portent of a hysterical future
threatened with inflation, war and economic crises, press the
need for Judicial Activism just as the dark days of the early
Franklin Roosevelt administration begged for and needed Judicial
Activism. It should be pointed out that this defense of Judicial
Activism is by no means a complete condemnation of Judicial Self
Denial. There is certainly a need for the latter attitude to check
a precocious growth of the law. The anxiety to mete out justice
and dispatch can cause confusions as witnessed by the Tidewater
case. There is a need for a conservative influence to give the
law stability; but the prime veneration should be for man and
his needs.
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How Have These Attitudes Affected the Personality of the
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts?
Generally speaking, how then, have these two attitudes of
Judicial Activism and Judicial Self Denial affected the per-
sonality of the jurisdiction of the federal courts? In the federal
question development, it is evident that the Denial attitude has
prevailed. Starting with the broad Active interpretation of fed-
eral question cases found in the Osborn case, this Denial attitude
persistently inhibited the scope of that jurisdiction until it
reached the repressive proportions of the Gully case. Since the
Osborn case was never overruled, fragments of its Active indica-
tions are still found in some phases of federal question jurisdic-
tion. Because of this, federal question jurisdiction may be said
to have somewhat of a conjectural and dual personality; one side
retentive and the other side renouncing. This conjectural per-
sonality was further perplexed by the mystifying Denial holding
of the Hum case. However, the Active concept of ancillary juris-
diction operated to broaden the receptive potential of federal
question jurisdiction, and it even found expression in the strict,
confining Hum reasoning. In diversity jurisdiction, the restric-
tive Denial rule of the Strawbridge case was mitigated by the
Active doctrine of separability innervated by ancillary jurisdic-
tion. The Active formulation of the presumption that members of
a corporation are citizens of the state of incorporation relaxed
some of the restriction of the Strawbridge rule and broadened
the receptive potential of diversity jurisdiction. The Active rea-
soning in the Tidewater case, in opposition to the Denial Hepburn
case made for a more equitable personality. Denial influences
and checks, in the Tidewater case, kept the Active influences
from placing a licentious aspect to diversity jurisdiction. In re-
moval jurisdiction, the Active protection of the right to remove
gave some outlet to the personality. However, it was a per-
sonality frustrated by a heritage seethed in political trauma, frus-
trated by a dependence upon the state's conception of jurisdic-
tion, and confused by a dependence upon the Active and Denial
rules of federal question and diversity jurisdiction. To carry the
frustration further, was the Hum inspired section 1441 (c) of the
judicial code, allowing removal of only separate and independent
claims. Some of this frustration was alleviated by the Active
therapeutics of ancillary jurisdiction. In venerating uniformity,
the Denial holding in the Finn case inhibited any condescending
tendencies this jurisdiction might have had. Throughout all the
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jurisdiction of the federal courts, Denial influences have kept the
Active application of ancillary jurisdiction from converting the
jurisdiction into a completely officious personality. To sum it up,
the courts, with what they have had to work with, have made
federal question jurisdiction a "guess" with a dual personality re-
ceptive on the one side and restrictive on the other side, both
beset by complex manners in being approached. In diversity
jurisdiction, they have developed a rather retentive personality
with relatively few inhibited traits. In removal jurisdiction, they
have evolved a tense, complex and rejecting personality, beset
by the same mystifying manners in being approached as in the
federal question jurisdiction.
It seems that the federal courts, in determining their au-
thority to decide a case or controversy, exercise two main views.
These views seem to be sponsored by a desire to interpret the
law as it is written on the one hand, and a desire to mete out
justice with dispatch and convenience on the other hand. Be-
cause the jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited, the Denial
school finds more support in the law proper. On the other hand,
the Activist school, hampered by the "Constitutional Grants" of
jurisdiction, finds support in legal philosophies and expedients.
Both are extreme schools of thought and are neutralized by the
effect of one upon the other. The Denial viewpoint does not let
the federal courts forget their literal limitations and recited func-
tions in the federal set-up. The Activist viewpoint does not let the
federal courts forget their broad function as pinnacles of justice
having a responsibility, a current responsibility, to the law and
the people affected thereby. They feel that this responsibility
cannot be facilitated by a denying of jurisdiction upon every
technicality. Together, these two viewpoints insert into the juris-
diction of the federal courts a discernible personality which
should be evaluated by members of the bar as readily as they
would evaluate the personality of a client, or a witness, or even
an adversary.
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